The nature of the war

For years now we have been fed one shibboleth after another. " we'll stand down as they stand up", "mission accomplished", "stay the course", "no cut and run", etc. The "War on terror" is a complete misnomer. "Terrorism" is a tactic, not an entity. Consequently "winning the war on terror" is ambiguous. The situation in Iraq is multifaceted. The insurrection is against the occupation- we leave, the insurrection is over. Al Queada is another matter. Routing out an idea is very difficult and extends over time. We can't kill all those whose ideas we don't like. It is an infection of the Islamic world that requires an antidote that is both military and social. It must be faced rationally and not just militarily. The Sunni - Shiite sectarian conflict is generational and not something we can solve. Only they can solve it in their own way. Not in a manner prescribed by us nor managed by us. We are simply caught in the cross fire. We can't sustain our present position so we must withdraw sometime- the sooner the better. The "chaos" will continue till it burns itself out. In any event Iraq will not be a democracy as we would like it but a theocracy run by the Mullahs.
The oft used phrase "in our national interest" means primarily one thing - OIL. To win the war simply means "control the oil". That was the principal aim of the war and will dictate our method of its resolution. Rumsfeld and Cheney convinced Bush the war could be won "on the cheap". Quick in and quick out. Didn't happen. The oil turned out to be a tar baby and we got stuck to it. Instead of a compliant Iraqi government we now will be required to occupy the country indefinitely for fear that Iran or Russia will move in. That was the fear to begin with so not much has changed, other than 600 billion in treasure lost, 4000 G.I.s killed, many thousands grievously wounded and an estimated 600 thousand Iraqis dead. Even seemingly
intelligent people do extremely stupid things. A recent column by Gwynne Dyer of London, an independent international columnist raised a new angle on the reason for the war. " The strategic community in Washington has identified China as America's new strategic rival, and it is becoming more and more vulnerable to interference with its oil imports." ".... the desire for permanent bases in the Gulf from which the U.S. could, at need, stop oil flowing to China". Despite writing a great deal about the administration's motives for the war Dyer admits "in the end I don't know why they did it. I suspect they don't know either. It just seemed like a neat idea at the time". Dyer, incidentally agrees with my contention that Saddam was in no position to threaten anyone.

From the front- From Op-Ed page NYTimes

My comments are puny compared to the words from men at the front who live the tragedy day by day.

New York Times

Sep. 12, 2007 | By Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance T. Gray and Jeremy A. Murphy.

BAGHDAD -- Viewed from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the "battle space" remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers' expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a "time-sensitive target acquisition mission" on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse -- namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington's insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made -- de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government -- places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict -- as we do now -- will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. "Lucky" Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, "We need security, not free food."

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are -- an army of occupation -- and force our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.

Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

--

Petreaus and Crocker- No solutions

The hearings, such as they were, have occurred and have left a wake of frustration and chagrin. There is no solution, that is acceptable, to the situation in Iraq. The attempt to spontaneously create a democracy by the mere charade of an election, in which a major segment of the population abstained, and the subsequent formation of a "government", that is simply a sectarian mongrel group of self serving individuals, is disingenuous in the extreme. The old saying: "you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear" applies in Iraq. The people are not used to democratically elected leaders. They are accustomed to being told by their Imams what to do. They are highly trained and educated in the authority of those religious leaders. They take their religion very seriously and spend more of their energy worshiping and praying than anything else. There is no infrastructure of society that enables Iraqis to interact with a government in which they have any say. Their loyalties are to their tribe and they are fierce defenders of their tribal customs. Tribal rivalry is endemic to their culture and they never forget an insult but attempt revenge for any felt injustice. The English found early on in their meddling in the ME that attempting to govern there is "like herding cats".
Our presence in Iraq is seen by Iraqis as an "occupation" that is to be resisted in every way. It has been blown up to be an assault on Islam itself. This calls for the Jihad, or Holy war. The Madrases, or religious schools, preach the necessity of fighting the occupation as a noble deed even to the extent of giving one's life in the notorious "suicide bomber" act. There is no reasoning with someone willing to blow them self up with the expectation of immortal life and a bevy of virgins to boot.
As dire as the prediction of the ensuing chaos and bloodshed following our withdrawal is it appears that that is the ultimate outcome no matter how long American forces attempt to prevent it. We can't change a culture, which is what we are fighting, and we simply have to accept the consequences of our blunder in invading in the first place. All the administrations promises and predictions have been wrong so far, very likely the latest one is wrong also. More of the same is just not acceptable.
The most pressing issue is the pursuit of Alqueada. This has been delayed and side tracked by the Iraq war and must be resumed. The 9/11 attack was a lucky, bold stroke, by the bin Laden led gang. We were tragically caught with our pants down and the blame game will go on for a long time. None the less, our diversion played right into the hand of bin Laden far better than he could have hoped for. That battlefield became the best recruitment tool for Alqueada. Currently is seems that the Taliban like extremism practiced by the affiliates of Alqueada in Iraq has roused the animosity of certain Sunni chieftains to the extent of their choosing to fight them, either instead of or in addition to, the Americans. How far that goes remains to be seen. Characteristically, Bush has interpreted the matter as proof of his plan's effectiveness. BS!!
Almost as the hearings were in progress Bush announced his acceptance of Petraeous' plan as what will ensue through the remainder of his term. Let the next President deal with the clean up. Bush is going out on the circuit and "make some money to refill the coffers". The latest worry is that with Rove gone Cheney has less opposition to his designs to attack Iran. Hopefully Bush has had enough wrong advice to fall for that line at this time. "Stupid is what stupid does".